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INTRODUCTION
The controversy surrounding implementation of 
the Common Core State Standards (CCSS) offers an 
intriguing case study for better understanding the 
political dynamics—and potential limitations—of 
transpartisan coalitions. The Common Core was 
originally promoted in 2010 by a centrist bi-partisan 
coalition that included Democrats interested in 
leveraging more rigorous academic standards to 
improve educational opportunity and moderate pro-
business Republicans concerned about workforce 
development. As states moved to implement the 
new Standards (and aligned assessments), an anti-
Common Core coalition arose first on the far right 
among Tea Party activists and then from the left, 
particularly among teacher advocacy groups. From 
the margins, opposition flowed into the mainstream. 
While temporarily united by their opposition to 
the CCSS, opponents across the political spectrum 
did not agree on the sources of their concern or on 
policy solutions. Understanding where the disparate 
sides of this coalition agreed and disagreed on the 
specific issue of the Common Core, and education 
policy more generally, can shed light on the 
conditions under which transpartisanship might 
flourish and the extent to which these types of 
coalitions can impact policy and remain aligned 
over time.
The Common Core is the latest in a series of 
American education reforms intended to use 
standards to leverage improvement (Supovitz & 
Spillane, 2015). In the 1980s education reformers 
emphasized minimum competency testing, but 
the standards intended to be a floor quickly 
became a ceiling. This spurred the systemic 
reform movements of the 1990s in which reformers 
advocated that states develop high standards and 
aligned accountability systems, while maintaining 
local flexibility. However, state standards and 
assessment systems were of uneven quality and 
rigor. Further, political pressure often pushed states 
to adjust test pass rates to avoid public backlash. 
Policymakers also learned that standards and 
assessments alone did not catalyze the capacity 
necessary for improving educational infrastructure.
The latest standards movement is an effort 
to remedy many of these past weaknesses. 
The Common Core State Standards (CCSS) in 
mathematics and English language arts were 
developed at the behest of the National Governors 
Association (NGA) and the Council of Chief 
State School Officers (CCSSO). The CCSS set 
forth what students should know and be able 
to do in mathematics and English language arts 
at each grade level from Kindergarten to 12th 
grade. Advocates argued that high, uniform 
academic standards would improve the academic 
performance of American students and better 
prepare them for college and careers. 
In many ways, Core proponents adopted a 
technocratic view of education reform. They saw 
America’s fragmented and varied approach to 
public schooling and standards-setting as a barrier 
to systemic innovation and improvement. They 
believed that the country’s 50 states and over 
15,000 school districts fostered incoherence and 
stifled scalable innovation because the producers of 
instructional materials (such as textbook publishers 
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and software developers and assessment producers) 
had to cater to small idiosyncratic markets rather 
than leverage their resources to develop new 
approaches at scale. This was the educational 
theory of change for how the CCSS would bring 
systemic reform to American schools.
Educational theories of change also require political 
theories of action. Core advocates presented 
national standards as a “common sense” solution 
from experts which they hoped would repress 
political opposition. This is a fairly common strategy 
in American politics—anti-political politics—and 
sometimes it works. But it also threatens a fairly 
predictable reaction, in populist anti-elitism. 
Standards advocates also believed that many states 
needed incentives and support to build the systems 
necessary, but that a direct federal mandate (grant-
in-aid condition) to adopt the Core would infuriate 
people across the political spectrum and likely 
doom the effort. The strategy that emerged went 
to great lengths to emphasize the Standards as a 
bipartisan (or even non-partisan) effort, pointing 
to them as a product of governors rather than 
national political leaders, and focused on speeding 
the adoption process without direct federal 
intervention. The standards were cast as “national 
but not federal” with federal incentives (but not 
requirements) for states to adopt them. 
The carrots that the federal government used to 
encourage states to adopt the Core were the Race to 
the Top (RTTT) competitive grant competition and 
the NCLB waiver application process. These carrots 
were candied by circumstances, as the RTTT bounty 
was made possible by the American Reinvestment 
and Recovery Act stimulus funding due to the 
2008 economic downturn. The U.S. Department of 
Education No Child Left Behind waiver guidelines 
also made it clear that adopting higher standards 
(such as the Core) would make it much more likely 
that waiver applications would be approved. The 
nature of both of these application processes also 
put governors and chief state school officers—who 
tend to be more inclined to endorse systemic school 
reforms irrespective of party affiliation—in charge 
of drafting state applications, rather than more 
change-adverse state legislatures. The federal 
incentives were further supplemented by more 
than $200 million in Gates Foundation money, 
which went towards a plethora of state and local 
political advocacy groups supporting CCSS adoption 
(Layton, 2014). 
IMPLEMENTING AND COMMUNICATING 
THE CORE
For a while, this low-profile strategy worked. The 
scope of conflict around the Core remained narrow 
and the issue was relatively non-controversial. In 
2010, 46 states and the District of Columbia adopted 
the Core standards (McDonnell & Weatherford, 
2013). Forty-four also initially signed on to use 
one of the aligned assessments developed by the 
Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College 
and Careers (PARCC) and the Smarter Balanced 
Assessment Consortium (SBAC) (Forgione, 2012). 
What early opposition existed got scant attention 
from the mainstream media (Rothman, 2011). This 
created the misimpression that the Standards 
movement would proceed without substantial 
controversy. Several Core advocates we interviewed 
noted that the quiet early implementation period 
and the lack of controversy contributed to a 
perception of widespread support (Supovitz & 
McGuinn, 2015), even though polls showed that 
few Americans knew what the Core was at that 
time (Maxwell, 2013). This resulted in a low sense 
of urgency and relatively few resources expended 
on defining a pro-Core message. “I think there 
was a massive underinvestment in Common 
4POLITICAL REFORM   |    PARALLEL PLAY IN THE EDUCATION SANDBOX
Core advocacy between 2010 and 2012,” said one 
advocacy group leader. Another Core advocacy 
group leader noted, 
Shame on us really, because it was very 
naïve. There were always these handfuls 
of people. . . harping about the standards. 
But for two years that was it. It didn’t really 
get much beyond that. And then all of a 
sudden it just happened very fast that they 
managed to sort of light a fire with the Tea 
Party. … I think many of us would say we 
expected there to be some backlash from 
the right but not for it to be as politicized as 
it eventually became.
As a consequence of the low profile of the CCSS, 
the diverse array of organizations involved, and the 
diffuse ownership of the standards the messages 
of advocates were disconnected and discordant 
(McGuinn 2015). “This is a fight that escalated 
quickly that seemed to sort of overwhelm everyone 
and … no one ever built any kind of coordinating 
thing that stuck from the beginning with the right 
people at the table that would meet and figure out 
the strategy around this ….” said one Core advocacy 
group leader. Another similarly commented: “when 
it became clear that there was going to be stiff 
opposition people ran around throwing money 
everywhere, you know, trying to play catch up and 
there wasn’t …a lot of relationship building and 
information building, not even a really clear sense 
of like what do we need to do to win this?  And what 
would it look like?  Unlike, say, the slow and steady 
approach to advancing vouchers, or supporting 
charter reform. You just can’t start up a movement 
in short order from scratch.” Many attributed the 
decline in support for the Core to the lack of a 
coherent and coordinated messaging campaign in 
the early 2010s.
There was no clarity about whose job it was to 
communicate on behalf of the Common Core, 
and little effort around grassroots engagement or 
mobilization. The standards were created by the 
National Governors Association and the Council 
of Chief State School Officers, but as member 
organizations with small staffs, they are neither 
equipped nor culturally inclined to engage in large-
scale communications work with the general public. 
Although many of the pro-Common Core groups 
knew each other and had regular contact about 
communications strategy, several of our interview 
respondents felt that there was not a systemic 
and organized campaign to sway public opinion. 
As one advocacy group leader said, “We have not 
mounted the kind of really expensive, concerted, 
multi-million dollar public education campaigns 
that might bring that silent majority in. I’m not 
aware of anyone that has actually coordinated that. 
And I think that’s one of the biggest challenges for 
supporters of Common Core.” 
The Hunt Institute, an education advocacy 
organization and CCSS supporter, hosted a regular 
conference call with CCSS proponents in an attempt 
to better coordinate communication effort, but it 
had little ability to push the unwieldy coalition to 
take specific actions. By default, messaging fell 
to state departments of education, which have 
their own capacity issues and tend to be staffed by 
technocrats; they developed a technocratic message 
that fell on deaf ears. Advocates struggled to combat 
the passionate ideological rhetoric of opponents 
like Glenn Beck and Michelle Malkin with reasoned 
arguments about the Core’s benefits.
Similarly, our interviews revealed that the two 
assessment consortia (PARCC and SBAC) focused 
on addressing the technical issues surrounding the 
design, piloting, and full implementation of the 
Although many of the pro-Common 
Core groups knew each other 
and had regular contact about 
communications strategy, several 
of our interview respondents felt 
that there was not a systemic and 
organized campaign to sway public 
opinion.
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new assessments and did not see it as their job to 
defend the assessments or standards politically. In 
general, the national organizations seem to feel that 
communications work should be done by state and 
local agencies, while the state and local folks felt 
that it should be the responsibility of the national 
organizations. In addition, arguments against 
the Common Core (and the groups making them) 
varied widely, making it difficult to develop a single 
response (Williams, 2014). 
Much of the communications done by Core 
proponents has been passive or reactive. While 
advocacy groups developed informational 
materials, tool kits, and web sites that touted the 
benefits of the Common Core, they often didn’t 
actively push that message out to schools and 
communities. Much of the messaging responded to 
attacks on the Core rather than proactively making 
the case for it. 
RISING OPPOSITION
During the latter part of 2013 and early 2014 there 
was a palpable sense that the tide was beginning 
to turn against the CCSS—in polling, media and 
talk shows—and defections of governors such as 
Mike Huckabee and Bobby Jindal. As states moved 
toward full implementation of the new standards 
and aligned assessments during the 2014-2015 
school year, an anti-Common Core coalition gained 
strength. 
The first organized opposition came from the far 
right among media and Tea Party activists. Left-
wing activists were next to organize, particularly 
inside teacher advocacy groups and unions. As 
less-political parent opposition gravitated to these 
groups, the issue moved rapidly from the margins of 
the parties into the mainstream. Some objections to 
the Common Core were shared across ideologies: a 
perception that the standards took a one-size-fits-all 
approach, created a de facto national curriculum, 
put too much emphasis on standardized tests, might 
threaten student privacy, and undermined teacher 
autonomy. Moreover, the Common Core was quickly 
linked to the emerging anti-testing backlash. While 
the Core standards were separate from the new 
assessments—states can and have adopted the 
Standards but not the tests—they became conflated 
in the public mind.
Opinion surveys demonstrate that much 
opposition to the Common Core—on both the 
right and the left—is based on misinformation 
or misunderstanding. For example, only half of 
Americans who have heard of the Core understand 
that states and local school districts retain the 
ability to choose their own educational materials 
(Henderson et al., 2015). Advocates have struggled 
to combat the volume and speed of opponents’ 
messaging on social media where information 
(and misinformation) is disseminated rapidly and 
widely. Groundbreaking research on Common 
Core social media has revealed that a handful of 
individuals are creating many groups and most of 
the content, and there is neither real debate over the 
standards nor communication between supporters 
and opponents (Supovitz, Daly, & del Fresno, 2015). 
Instead, social media serves as an echo chamber in 
which opponents talk to opponents and supporters 
to supporters.
Core advocates have struggled to articulate a clear, 
consistent, and convincing rationale for how the 
standards will improve American education. They 
focused initially on communicating with political 
The first organized opposition came 
from the far right among media 
and Tea Party activists. Left-wing 
activists were next to organize, 
particularly inside teacher 
advocacy groups and unions.
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elites in order to get the Core adopted and to protect 
it from repeal attempts in state legislatures. Then 
they focused on communicating with teachers 
and administrators to assist with implementation. 
Advocates did not turn their attention to the public 
until much later and, as a result, allowed opponents 
to negatively define the Core for far too long.
Common Core advocates also have been challenged 
by the tremendous turnover among governors, 
legislators, and state superintendents. Officials 
who initially made the decision to adopt the Core 
are no longer in office, replaced by politicians 
less supportive or less invested in its success.1 
This problem was exacerbated by the Republican 
electoral landslide in the November 2014 elections, 
during the first full year of implementation and 
testing. With those invested officials gone, the 
weaknesses of the “under the radar” strategy 
became more visible. The speed and process by 
which states adopted the Common Core and took 
on the Race to the Top application process without 
much public discussion or debate, though it initially 
seemed so effective, would ultimately generate 
anger, resentment, and a perception of subterfuge 
which crossed party lines. A co-founder of the 
anti-Core Badass Teachers Association called them 
the “stealth standards,” while Jamie Gass, the 
Director of the Center for School Reform at Pioneer 
Institute (a leading anti-Core group), notes: “In 
hindsight we know that the Obama administration 
and the players from D.C. that were in favor of this 
were really trying to pull a fast one. And that is 
what has animated a lot of the opposition; and 
it really cuts across the political spectrum.” 
But the left and right anchors of the backlash had 
other, profoundly different, objections; what is 
more, they do not agree on a “fix” to the Common 
Core, much less broader education policy.
GROWING CONSERVATIVE RESISTANCE
Tea Party adherents and others on the right 
view the Common Core as a dangerous—even 
unconstitutional—expansion of federal control 
into education and a violation of states’ rights. 
Beginning with the passage of No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) in 2001, the federal role in education 
has grown tremendously and, like the law itself, 
has become more controversial. The Obama 
administration’s use of the Race to the Top grant 
competition and NCLB waiver application process 
to encourage states to adopt the standards, and 
its funding of the two consortia that developed 
the aligned assessments, have fed concerns that 
Uncle Sam is becoming the national schoolmarm. 
This involvement, along with the Obama 
administration’s vocal support for the Core, has 
made it easy for opponents to cast it as a federal 
initiative. 
Opposition grew among conservatives after a 
number of conservative talk show hosts (such 
as Glenn Beck) and national conservative 
organizations (including Heritage, Cato, Americans 
for Prosperity, Freedom Works, American Principles 
Project, and Pioneer Institute) began to publicize 
their opposition, fund ad campaigns, and mobilize 
activists. As Jamieson and Cappella noted in their 
2008 book Echo Chamber, conservative talk radio 
has come to play a central role in setting the agenda 
for the Republican Party.2  Journalist Tim Murphy’s 
analysis found that “when states began to move 
forward with the implementation…Common Core 
fast became a tea party cause célèbre…the reform 
Tea Party adherents and others 
on the right view the Common 
Core as a dangerous—even 
unconstitutional—expansion of 
federal control into education and 
a violation of states’ rights.
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was viewed as yet another prong of Obama’s 
devious master plan, one aided and abetted by a 
sinister group of politicians and businessmen.”3 
Opposition to the Core also represented a rejection 
of establishment Republican cooperation with 
Democrats, and a political style of complete 
opposition to big government.4  In the aftermath of 
the 2012 Supreme Court decision, which largely put 
an end to the effort to roll back the Affordable Care 
Act, conservative commentators and organizers 
seized on the Common Core and the federal role 
in education as the primary focus of their anti-
Obama animus. The fight against “Obamacare” 
transitioned into the fight against “Obamacore.” 
Some conservative organizations, such as Freedom 
Works, the American Principles Project, and Pioneer 
Institute, have also used opposition to the Common 
Core to attract new members and donations.5 A few 
Republican candidates used the issue as well during 
the 2014 elections to rally support, as did some 2016 
presidential contenders, particularly Louisiana Gov. 
Bobby Jindal and New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie, 
both former Core supporters.6
Jane Robbins, Senior Fellow at the American 
Principles Project, described the Core as an “attempt 
to centralize control over education so that we have 
one set of standards which inevitably leads to one 
curriculum or curriculums that are very similar 
to each other and ideally one set of assessment or 
assessments that are all very similar to each other. 
It reduces parental autonomy and control over their 
children’s education.” She added that “certainly 
the movement started among groups that would be 
considered more conservative, but it’s not confined 
to that at all…there are a lot of groups that in no 
way could be described as conservative who are 
quite as upset about this as people on the other side 
of the aisle. It’s primarily parent groups that have 
started the movement to stop Common Core and it’s 
through those groups that we’ve made the pitch, but 
it’s not just to conservatives or to Republicans.”
The crafting of new national standards also 
reignited long-standing ideological debates about 
religion and multiculturalism, and the teaching 
of literature, history, and science.7 Opponents 
of the Core cast it as a national curriculum that 
is ill-suited to a country with such religious, 
political, ethnic, and cultural diversity.8 Christian 
conservatives asserted that the Core would result in 
the indoctrination of children on such hot-button 
issues as homosexuality and socialism. The Family 
Research Council, an influential religious-right 
group, repeatedly warned about the dangers of the 
Common Core and Michael Farris, president of the 
Home School Legal Defense Association, stated 
that “I just fundamentally don’t believe in using 
centralized government standards.”9 Additionally, 
the centralized collection of student information 
and test scores collided with heightened fears of 
data mining. For example, a 2014 survey by right-
leaning Education Next found that 85 perfect of 
Americans who have heard of the Common Core 
erroneously believe the federal government will 
receive detailed data on individual students’ test 
performance (Henderson, Peterson, & West, 2015).
The crafting of new national 
standards also reignited long-
standing ideological debates about 
religion and multiculturalism, and 
the teaching of literature, history, 
and science.
In the aftermath of the 2012 
Supreme Court decision, which 
largely put an end to the effort to 
roll back the Affordable Care Act, 
conservative commentators and 
organizers seized on the Common 
Core and the federal role in 
education as the primary focus of 
their anti-Obama animus.
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THE PROGRESSIVE BACKLASH
Opponents on the left got organized a bit later than 
conservatives—one seminal moment is the 2013 
founding of the Badass Teachers Association. In a 
2013 interview, co-founder and co-president Mark 
Naison emphasized the grassroots nature of the 
group, its dependence on social media and protests, 
and its work within—but not directly with—teachers 
unions. He remarked that: “We don’t raise a cent. 
This is all done without any money. We’re not a non-
profit, we don’t collect dues, we don’t get grants. It’s 
all social media driven and driven by very smart, 
very angry people.” Within a year of its founding, 
the group claimed 39,000 members.
Opposition focused on long-standing concerns of 
the left: teacher evaluations, the role of corporations 
in education, and the call for greater focus on 
underlying social inequities.10  The Business 
Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
and major corporations such as ExxonMobil, Intel, 
and Time Warner Cable have funded Common Core 
advocacy campaigns, as have foundations with 
close corporate ties, such as the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation. This association of big business 
with the Core comes at a time of unprecedented 
corporate political contributions and enormous 
economic inequality and has raised considerable 
suspicion on the left.11 Some argue that the Core 
was a scheme intended to increase profits for big 
textbook providers (such as Pearson), education 
tech companies (such as Microsoft), or test makers 
(such as the College Board).12 Still others see 
the Core as part of an even larger conspiracy to 
dismantle public schools and privatize education 
entirely.13 This led critics on the left such as Diane 
Ravitch to rail against the Common Core as yet 
another nefarious example of “corporate school 
reform.”14
As state implementation of the CCSS proceeded, 
many teachers became concerned that states were 
tying evaluation systems to the new standards and 
assessments before the kinks have been ironed 
out. They fear this will result in arbitrary or unfair 
personnel decisions. A 2014 Gallup poll found that 
76 percent of teachers continued to support the 
goals of the Common Core, but only 27 percent 
supported using computerized tests to measure 
student performance, and only 9 percent supported 
using those test scores to evaluate teachers (Lyons, 
2014). At its 2015 convention, the NEA formally 
adopted resolutions in support of the testing 
opt-out movement and in opposition to the use of 
Common Core aligned tests to evaluate teachers 
or rate schools.15 APP’s Robbins noted that the 
teachers’ unions and conservatives look at these 
issues from a different perspective. “The teachers’ 
unions really are being pulled into it because of the 
teacher-evaluation part—the high-stakes testing, 
basing teacher evaluations on the test scores, tying 
everything to the test results. But although many 
conservatives also question the appropriateness 
of this type of teacher evaluation, that’s not the 
primary focus of what we’re doing—we are focused 
more on parental rights and local control.”
Opposition focused on long-
standing concerns of the left: 
teacher evaluations, the role of 
corporations in education, and the 
call for greater focus on underlying 
social inequities.
As state implementation of the 
CCSS proceeded, many teachers 
became concerned that states 
were tying evaluation systems 
to the new standards and 
assessments before the kinks have 
been ironed out.
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HINTS OF A TRANSPARTISAN COALITION
Finally, many left activists argue that the Common 
Core movement misses the mark because it does not 
address the underlying social inequities at the root 
of educational performance gaps. Thus, the debate 
over the Common Core became entangled with 
long-standing liberal concerns that governments 
are not doing enough to address poverty, safety, 
health, and other out-of-school factors affecting 
student achievement, and that teachers lack 
sufficient training and resources to meet the needs 
of disadvantaged students. 
While conservatives and progressives emphasized 
different reasons for their opposition to Common 
Core, their shared concerns and shared goal of 
repeal seemed to offer coalition potential. National 
organizations like Freedom Works and Heritage on 
the right, and Save Our Schools and the NEA on 
the left, began to produce and disseminate videos, 
research briefs, talking points, and even full length 
movies (as was the case of Glenn Beck’s “We Will 
Not Conform” film which appeared in theaters 
across the country). In many states, teachers unions 
and conservative organizations joined grassroots 
anti-Common Core groups in calling for legislation 
to repeal the standards and/or delay the stakes for 
teachers and students connected to test scores. 
But outside of the lobbying in state legislatures, 
the real anti-Common Core action was grassroots, 
with much of the communication occurring through 
social media such as Facebook, You Tube, and 
Twitter (Supovitz, Daly, Del Fresno, 2015). Pioneer’s 
Gass remarked that “It’s been really a loose coalition 
of folks. It hasn’t had the same kind of top-down 
structure or centralized coordination that I think the 
other side has had…it wasn’t a coalition of people 
on the two ends of the political spectrum, but there 
was broad, pretty deep opposition to Common Core, 
to PARCC and SBAC, a lot of the components of Race 
to the Top…it’s hard to really pigeon-hole the anti-
Common Core audience to just one political stripe or 
another.” 
Andrea Neal, a former Indiana state school 
board member, observed that “I certainly have 
seen a strange alliance between Tea Party type 
conservatives and more liberal progressive 
education reformers, in that both seem to favor 
more local control. So it’s not a clean Republican/
Democrat/Conservative/Liberal breakdown at 
all. It’s more about who decides what goes on in 
our schools.” Mark Naison, a liberal social justice 
activist, Fordham professor of African American 
studies, and co-founder of the Badass Teachers 
Association has remarked that “Never have I found 
myself finding so much common ground with 
people who call themselves conservatives and 
libertarians—we all agreed public schools were 
going to be ruined by this. This really represents 
the worst fantasies of both the right and the left 
coming true: Big Government and Big Corporations 
imposing this terrible, untested, expensive plan 
using intimidation and bullying.”16
While individuals from across the political spectrum 
united in opposition to the Core and formed new 
grassroots groups, there does not appear to have 
been much direct communication or coordination 
between established state or national organizations 
such as Tea Party groups and teachers unions. 
While conservatives and 
progressives emphasized different 
reasons for their opposition 
to Common Core, their shared 
concerns and shared goal of repeal 
seemed to offer coalition potential.
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Opposition appears to have begun in a purely 
partisan way among conservatives and then 
developed support on the other side. There was 
little engagement between different groups of 
opponents. For example, analysis of twitter 
data focusing on the hasthtag commoncore 
(#commoncore) from 2013-2014 showed three 
distinct sub-communities of supporters of the CCSS, 
opponents inside education, and opponents outside 
of education (Supovitz, Daly, Del Fresno, 2015). 
Figure 1
Transpartisan Debate about #commoncore on Twitter, 
September 2013-February 2014
Supporters Opponents within education Opponents outside education
Source: #commoncore Project, 
http://www.hashtagcommoncore.com
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INDIANA CASE STUDY: 
FLEETING TRANSPARTISANSHIP, 
SYMBOLIC VICTORY
A close examination of two of the more prominent 
Common Core battleground states, Indiana and 
Oklahoma, reveals how transpartisan collaboration 
aided Core opponents but also how quickly that 
partnership hit its limits.
Indiana was the first state to officially drop out of 
Common Core and PARCC. The opposition was led 
by a group called Hoosiers against Common Core, 
which identified its sole purpose as “to have the 
adoption of Common Core reversed and end the 
new PARCC test.” Its aims offered a mix of liberal 
and conservative touchstones:  “restore local 
control of education, restore quality standards, 
restore the right of teachers to practice their craft, 
and reduce the power of standardized testing.”17 
Erin Tuttle, one of the co-founders of the group, 
recalled her shock on discovering that a state 
voucher law requiring private schools to offer state 
assessments had led her son’s private Catholic 
school to adopt Common Core. She remarked that 
“When we found out the switch to Common Core 
was due to the adoption of national standards, 
we were unaware new standards were even in 
place. There was no public notice. The schools 
made this big shift for the worse and parents were 
upset. That’s how I got involved.” Former Indiana 
school board member Andrea Neal said, “Indiana’s 
effort was extremely homegrown. I’m not aware of 
outsiders coming in to organize, that’s for sure. I 
believe Indiana’s opposition to Common Core really 
bubbled up from the parents.”
Tuttle brought her concerns to state legislator Gus 
Schneider; she reports that he also was unaware 
that the state had adopted the national standards. 
He agreed to put forth legislation to repeal the 
Common Core. After it was defeated in committee, 
the emerging grassroots group swung into action. 
Tuttle described the Hoosiers group as “a huge 
group of parents who hosted rallies, invited people 
to come. We crisscrossed the state and spoke at 
different events: political groups, church groups, 
parent groups, and some were just at personal 
homes. We started a website called Hoosiers against 
the Common Core, just to put that information out 
there. People would see our site and call us and 
we would come out. It really was a diverse group 
of parents. The most common denominator of 
the parents was that they were highly educated 
and involved with their child’s work.” The group 
depended heavily on social media—because it was 
free and, in Tuttle’s words, “a lot of parents, a lot of 
mothers, are on Facebook.”
She notes that the group reached out to several 
national conservative organizations such as the 
Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the 
American Principles Project and academic experts 
such as Bill Evers of the Hoover Institute, and two 
dissenting Common Core Validation Committee 
members Sandra Stotsky and James Milgram, to 
gather information “so that we felt comfortable in 
our own understanding of what the issues were.” 
She utilized the “Truth in American Education” 
website for the exchange of information about 
Common Core and the different battles in different 
states. 
While Tuttle encountered many individual teachers 
who opposed the Common Core, she reported the 
group had no assistance from any type of teachers 
union. Neal added that teachers unions and Tea 
Party conservatives “never really joined forces 
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here.” The Indiana Star concluded that a “tide of 
grassroots opponents—many fueled by President 
Barack Obama’s endorsement of Common Core 
turned key lawmakers from supporters into foes 
intent on dumping the guidelines.”18
The key players crossed party lines. Hoosiers 
against the Common Core did not oppose 
Republican Tony Bennett, a strong supporter of the 
Core during his campaign for re-election as state 
superintendent in 2012. But after his Democratic 
opponent Glenda Ritz, a former school librarian, 
teachers’ union president, and passionate 
opponent of the national standards, pulled off a 
surprise upset of Bennett, she joined forces with 
Governor Mike Pence—a former member of the Tea 
Party Caucus in Congress—to lead the effort for 
repeal. In 2013, the state legislature paused Core 
implementation and required the state board of 
education to adopt new standards.
While much has been made of Indiana’s formal 
“repeal” of the standards, it is important to assess 
what did and did not change. The law required 
that the CCSS be used as the “base model” for the 
new standards (so that the state would remain 
eligible for federal funds) and experts who have 
compared the “new” Indiana standards to the 
Common Core have found them to be extremely 
similar. Hoosiers against the Common Core’s 
Tuttle acknowledges this with frustration: “The 
[legislation] was successful—at least in repealing 
it by law. However, having the State Department of 
Education properly implement the law is another 
issue. They basically rewrote our “new” standards 
to be just like Common Core. Unfortunately, Indiana 
still has Common Core.” Neal, the state school 
board member, seconds this view: “I thought we 
were actually going to replace the Common Core 
with something better and something home grown, 
and all we did was rebrand the Common Core… 
So somehow we pretended to rewrite the Common 
Core and get credit for rewriting the Common Core 
when we didn’t actually do that.” Neal believes 
the grassroots anti-Common Core effort has run its 
course, and, while she thinks the standards will 
ultimately be repealed, “I think that we lost so 
soundly that it’s very difficult to keep fighting.”
The political alliance between the Republican 
governor and the Democratic superintendent 
dissolved quickly and spectacularly after the 
“repeal” of CCSS. One analysis noted that “the 
issues on which Pence and Ritz spar are many—
from school grading and teacher evaluations to 
school funding and charter schools” and that 
their “mutual support for new state standards has 
not translated to cooperation in other areas. As 
soon as the standards issue was over, Pence and 
Ritz immediately returned to a significant level 
of discord and criticism of each other.”19 Another 
observer noted: “at their core, Ritz and Pence 
disagree about education.”20   The transpartisan 
coalition in Indiana proved fleeting and had little 
long-term impact on educational politics or policy 
in the state.
Oklahoma is another case where transpartisanship 
seems like it might have played an important role 
in repeal of the Core. There, opposition was led by 
a group—Restore Oklahoma Public Education—that 
had originally been created in 2009 as a watchdog 
of public education for tax payers and parents. The 
group’s president, Jenni White, recalls that she 
learned the state had adopted Common Core while 
she was researching a tax initiative. “When I saw 
the part about Common Core, it really kind of stuck 
in my craw because to me standards were local.” 
White notes that “initially, our target audience was 
OKLAHOMA CASE STUDY: REPUTATIONAL 
TRANSPARTISANSHIP
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legislators because they were the ones who actually 
enacted the law without informing anybody. I 
mean they didn’t have a clue what they were doing. 
They just wanted to get federal money and sign up 
for it. But then we realized after three years that 
they weren’t going to budge on any of this, and we 
started going directly to parents.” 
The group used social media, email lists, surveys, 
petitions, and lobbying, “and then I just literally 
put many thousands of miles on my car driving 
around Oklahoma and talking to people, about this 
and what was actually going on at the federal level 
in education.” While she saw some Democratic 
opposition to the Core, White remarked that “it 
really was this primarily Republican-led movement” 
and that “most of the people that were interested 
were the Republican groups in our state.” She 
said: “I never did get calls from more Left-wing 
groups, or I would’ve gone. I never had a problem 
talking to anybody about it. But the fact that it’s an 
Obama administration initiative—the Democrats are 
naturally going to side with the President on that.” 
Like Hoosiers against Common Core, Restore 
Oklahoma Public Education partnered with a 
variety of conservative national organizations, 
including Truth in American Education21, the 
American Principles Project, the Pioneer Institute, 
and the Eagle Forum. National groups did 
not provide financial support, nor were there 
coordination meetings or conference calls. Rather, 
they were clearinghouses for information that could 
be passed along to parents and legislators. When 
asked whether her group partnered with the state’s 
teacher unions, White replied: 
Well, I wouldn’t say we were in partnership 
with them. For the most part we didn’t do 
anything with them because they were 
either pro-Common Core or they were 
neutral, or they were just more concerned 
about testing than they were about 
Common Core. So we didn’t really have any 
common ground with them.  Every once in 
a while they published something about 
testing that had a good solid message that 
we agreed with. 
As in Indiana, the Oklahoma anti-Common Core 
forces were successful in securing passage of a 
bill (in 2014) that “repealed” the standards. But 
the state Department of Education rejected a plan 
to return to the state’s old standards,22 there are 
concerns that the state’s new standards closely 
resemble the Common Core, and teachers and 
administrators who spent years training to adjust 
their curricula and pedagogy to the Core have been 
resistant to replacing it.23  White acknowledges that 
“We’re kind of heading in the Indiana direction 
with the standards rewrite. And that’s certainly 
very frustrating for us. And we’ve been putting 
out as much information as we possibly can on 
it. But at this point the legislators and the general 
public think to themselves, ‘Wow, hey, Common 
Core is repealed. I’m going back to sleep.’  I mean, 
it’s done for them—so engagement is always such 
a challenge when you’re trying to do anything 
politically.” The Oklahoma case demonstrates 
that while the anti-Common Core movement often 
attracted some liberal individuals to the cause, it 
was nonetheless a primarily (and organizationally) 
Republican-led effort.
The Indiana and Oklahoma case studies reveal that 
the “success” of the anti-Common Core coalition in 
these states—as well as in many others—has been 
overstated. Nonetheless, the “scope of conflict” 
around Common Core has clearly expanded 
dramatically over the past two years across the 
country with extensive media coverage and a large 
and diverse array of actors engaging on the issue.  
The Indiana and Oklahoma case 
studies reveal that the “success” 
of the anti-Common Core coalition 
in these states—as well as in many 
others—has been overstated.
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While the effort to roll back the Common Core at 
the state level was in many places stymied—or 
resulted in only symbolic victories, as in Indiana 
and Oklahoma—those very defeats encouraged the 
opposition to take their fight to the national level. 
In the wake of the “rebranding” of Common Core in 
Indiana, Tuttle says that Hoosiers against Common 
Core has “changed our strategy to direct more 
attention at federal policies because they control 
every aspect of state policy. We focused on the re-
authorization of No Child Left Behind. We wanted 
to get to the point where the U.S. Department of 
Education didn’t have as much influence over 
standards, assessments, and state education policy 
setting, and return that power back to the state 
level. The bureaucracy of the federal government 
has become unwieldy, and despite the hype in 
D.C., the passage of ESSA will do nothing to curtail 
it.” It is too early to ascertain the role that anti-
Common Core groups played in the December 
2015 passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act, 
which replaced NCLB and significantly reduced the 
federal role in education. It appears likely, however, 
that the centrist bipartisan coalition that came 
together to enact ESSA might not have emerged 
without the presence of transpartisan pressure from 
the ideological extremes of the Republican and 
Democratic parties.
While many have been quick to declare that ESSA 
amounts to a death knell for Common Core, it 
is important to note that the law itself doesn’t 
automatically repeal the Core in the states--it just 
prohibits the federal government from mandating 
or incentivizing states to adopt/maintain the 
standards in the future. Whether individual states 
that have already adopted the Common Core (the 
majority) end up dropping it will ultimately come 
down to the state level political dynamics discussed 
here.
Views on the potential of transpartisan coalitions 
such as those that emerged around Common Core 
vary widely. As one optimistic observer noted, 
“Unlike bipartisanship, which often takes two 
existing viewpoints and, effectively, splits the 
difference, transpartisanship encourages solutions 
that can align with many viewpoints…Passion, 
deftly deployed, is actually an effective political 
took with which to advance good ideas. That’s the 
promise of transpartisanship.”24  Others, however, 
believe that “it remains an open question whether 
transpartisanship can really suffice as an alternative 
to bipartisan problem solving” and emphasize the 
“issue-specific, time-limited, and thereby fleeting 
if not fickle nature of transpartisan coalitions.”25 
We see the ideological orthodoxy that fuels the 
passion of different factions in a transpartisan 
coalition to be a fundamental constraint because 
acknowledging the legitimacy of opponents reduces 
one’s standing amongst fellow members of the 
same ideological stripe. In the case of the Common 
Core, transpartisanship seemed like children from 
very different backgrounds parallel playing in the 
same sandbox. While they may have shared some 
of the same toys (i.e. arguments), when it comes to 
envisioning a different playground, they have little 
common ground for building a solution together. 
The longer no alternative vision to the existing 
common standards emerges, the less likely we are 
to see a course shift. The more time that states have 
adopted the Common Core standards, the less likely 
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they will drop them. State governments, school 
administrators, and teachers have already invested 
a tremendous amount of time, effort, and money 
in implementing the Core and re-aligning their 
education systems around the new standards and 
assessments.26 These represent “sunk costs” that 
cannot be recouped if a state changes direction. 
The replacement of the Core with something truly 
different would require significant new investment 
to develop. As a result, states are likely to become 
increasingly “path dependent” with regard to the 
Core.27 These dynamics mean that large numbers 
of states are unlikely to repeal the Core and that 
even in those states that do, many (like Indiana 
and Pennsylvania) are likely to simply rename 
their standards or adopt a slightly modified 
version. Despite the extensive media coverage, ad 
campaigns, social media activity, and legislative 
repeal efforts, as of spring 2015, 40 of the original 
45 states that adopted the Common Core remained 
committed to them. 
As we have already seen, however, it is more 
likely that states will pull out of the two major 
assessment consortium (PARCC and SBAC), which 
may ultimately constrain the impact that the 
new standards can have on American education. 
Pioneer’s Jamie Gass notes that “The major goal 
of the Common Core is to have a unified set of 
nationalized standards and tests. More states 
are now not in the testing consortia than are 
in the consortia so the commonality and the 
comparability across states is gone.” As of July 2015, 
about half of the states had withdrawn from the 
test consortia and states witnessed unprecedented 
rates of students opting out of tests during the 
2014-2015 academic year. Opposition to high stakes 
standardized testing mobilized opposition among 
parents—and particularly influential suburban 
parents—in a way that concern about standards did 
not.
Nonetheless, while the Common Core “brand” 
has been damaged, surveys show that support 
for the idea of national standards remains strong 
among teachers and the general public.28 Thus, the 
brand of the Common Core may fade, even while 
the concept of standards-based reform persists. In 
addition, in the past year several steps have been 
taken to address the other sources of controversy 
that have been connected to the Common Core. The 
testing consortia and state leaders have announced 
plans to reduce the amount of testing students will 
have to undertake; many states have announced 
a pause or postponement in the use of test scores 
in teacher evaluations; and the new Every Student 
Succeeds Act explicitly bans the federal government 
from mandating/incentivizing states to adopt the 
Common Core. 
Over time—as states persist with their 
implementation efforts—students, teachers, and 
parents are likely to become more accustomed 
to the new standards. As a result, predictions 
of the demise of the Common Core—and the 
ability of a transpartisan coalition to bring them 
down—are likely overblown.29 There has been less 
transpartisan engagement around the Common 
Core than might appear to be the case, and the 
victories that anti-Common Core forces have won 
have often been more symbolic than substantive. 
Several lessons about transpartisan politics can be 
gleaned from the Common Core story. 
First, “empty vessel” issues may enable 
transpartisanship. The Common Core debate 
served as a petri dish for a wide variety of concerns 
and deeply held beliefs about public education, 
including the role of the federal government and 
corporate America, the increasing prominence of 
testing and external accountability, and technology 
and data privacy issues. The nature of standards 
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as a broad lever for change also meant that it 
was connected to so many aspects of education 
that there was ample room for opponents to find 
common cause without sharing particular issues 
or concerns. Core proponents seem not to have 
anticipated the range and depth of American 
anxieties – across the political spectrum and among 
apolitical parents – the reforms would evoke.
Second, transpartisan initiatives may be more 
likely to arise from policy opposition than policy 
creation. The early phase of the Common Core 
Standards movement was notable for its carefully 
crafted bipartisan approach. The developers of the 
standards and their advocates took great pains 
to create broad support and to avoid the stigma 
of federal control by working through the CCSSO 
and NGA to brand the standards as state-led. The 
economic recession, the federal stimulus package, 
and the opportunistic way in which the RTTT 
incented rapid standards adoption, however, undid 
much of the groundwork paved by the decentralized 
strategy of the common standards. 
The left-right opposition had very divergent visions 
for education. Conservatives and progressives 
disagree about the proper role of government and 
public policy versus markets, and particularly about 
the appropriate role of the federal government vis a 
vis the states. On most economic and social policy 
issues, Tea Party Republicans and progressive 
Democrats literally could not be further apart. 
Within the education arena, the conservative 
education agenda is to abolish the U.S. Department 
of Education, reduce education spending, expand 
market-based reforms such as private school 
vouchers, and weaken (or abolish) collective 
bargaining and teachers unions. Teachers unions 
do not support policies that would weaken their 
own power and job protections, and progressives 
typically embrace a more robust federal role in 
education and increased education spending, and 
vehemently oppose vouchers.30
The anti-Core groups shared few if any positive 
goals, and they put little or no effort into 
dismantling the extreme hostility and distrust 
between them. Those at the ideological wings of 
both political parties tend to emphasize ideological 
purity, which in practice makes them less willing 
to compromise, but it is compromise which is the 
grease of policy creation. Transpartisan efforts that 
are pure alliances of convenience, with little to no 
shared strategy and infrastructure behind them, 
may be highly effective for delaying, diminishing or 
derailing policies—but are ineffective at enacting 
policies.
Third, transpartisanship may be more likely when 
there is no dominant message associated with 
an issue, and it is not associated with a particular 
political axis. The early bipartisan, below-the-radar 
strategy of the Core advocates made the standards 
vulnerable. They failed to control and cement the 
dominant message about the standards while the 
space was uncontested. While standards are a fairly 
abstract and technical issue and thus are hard to 
message, there was little coordination amongst 
advocacy groups supporting the Core and funders 
who were supporting their adoption in the states. 
This left the door open for opponents to paint the 
issue in their own terms. 
Additionally, the Common Core was the first major 
education issue to play out in the new landscape 
of social and alternative media. Anti-Core activists 
used these new tools effectively; Core proponents 
did not. The American Principles Project’s Robbins 
described the “huge” role of social media in this 
rise of opposition to the Common Core: “You get 
a group of parents together and they put up a 
Facebook page and things kind of takeoff from 
there. Twitter, Facebook have gotten the word 
out more so than it would have been possible 
otherwise…It’s the lifeblood of the movement.” 
Transpartisan opponents of the Core were far more 
effective in their use of social media to mobilize 
their supporters and influence the political process 
than were advocates. Whether policy advocates and 
funders seek to mobilize or neutralize these forces, 
they will need to prioritize longer-term planning 
for implementation, public communication, and 
analysis of grassroots political forces at the local 
and national level.
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Fourth, we may experience forms of 
transpartisanship in which groups at the 
ideological poles are partners without even 
communicating with each other. Sharing a 
common goal can be sufficient for transpartisanship 
to arise. In fact, the necessity of speaking to one’s 
base risks that acts of coordination are seen 
as consorting with the opposition. In this way 
opposition to the Common Core was very much 
like the left and the right parallel playing in the 
education sandbox. In transpartisan parallel play, 
the objective may be similar, but the arguments 
are very different. In this case, the arguments used 
by opponents on the right included intrusion of 
the federal government on state’s rights and local 
control and fear of data collection and privacy 
infringement. On the left, opposition to the 
standards was driven by objection to encroachment 
on teacher autonomy (anti-teacher evaluation), 
protests over the monetization of education, and 
anti-testing sentiment. Common goals do not 
necessarily mean common ground.
Fifth, outspoken presidential support for a policy 
can polarize an issue. As Smith and Seltzer (2015) 
have noted, twentieth century presidents have 
become very polarizing figures—particularly during 
periods of divided government. In this context, 
the bully pulpit is often counter-productive as 
presidents who publicly endorse a particular policy 
may succeed in mobilizing the opposition even 
more than they mobilize supporters. Hess (2014) has 
suggested that the Core might have had a different 
political trajectory if advocates had not pushed for 
rapid universal adoption “tainted” by federal and 
corporate endorsement, but rather had started in 
a smaller number of states that were genuinely 
enthusiastic about it, and let it spread over time to 
others as a result of proven success.
Finally, transpartisanship’s influence seems 
strongest at producing pressure at the 
agenda setting stage rather than at the policy 
construction stage. The grassroots backlash 
against the Common Core put pressure on 
establishment policymakers to respond—to do 
something—but they were less able to influence 
the content of the actual response. This led 
establishment interests to respond with largely 
toothless or symbolic policy—such as states 
renaming the Common Core without significantly 
changing the standards themselves.31  Similarly at 
the national level, while Core opponents succeeded 
in getting language included in the Every Student 
Succeeds Act that prevents the federal government 
from pressuring states in any way on national 
standards, the ultimate impact of this provision 
remains questionable. Diverse grassroots coalitions 
of the sort that arose in opposition to Common Core 
typically do not have the infrastructure, resources, 
or staying power to exert long-term influence. 
Transpartisan initiatives have longer-range staying 
power ONLY when they either entail significant 
contact and deliberate effort to develop ways of 
working together OR when the attention they garner 
mobilizes mainstream or elite actors – as in the 
case of anti-testing backlash moving into influential 
suburban school districts.
In sum, the Common Core issue provided fertile 
ground for transpartisan opponents to come 
together to raise concerns about an essentially 
centralized standards reform movement in the 
traditionally decentralized education terrain. 
However, because the transpartisan coalition 
lacked shared perspectives about the nature of the 
problem, when it came to seeking alternatives, the 
coalition proved to be built on quicksand. 
Transpartisanship’s influence 
seems strongest at producing 
pressure at the agenda setting 
stage rather than at the policy 
construction stage.
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